We present the following results pertaining to Fisher's market model:
INTRODUCTION
The fundamental market model of Fisher has been widely studied in economics [Brainard and Scarf 2000; Gale 1960] and in theoretical computer science Varadarajan 2004, 2007; Codenotti et al. 2005; Devanur et al. 2008; Garg et al. 2012 Garg et al. , 2014 Jain and Mahdian 2005; Jain and Vazirani 2010; Vazirani 2007] . A remarkable convex program, due to Eisenberg and Gale [1959] , captures equilibrium allocations, and its dual variables capture equilibrium prices for this model for several utility functions including linear, CES and Leontief utilities Varadarajan 2004, 2007; Gale 1960] .
Another seemingly very different convex program, CP , for the same market was discovered by Shmyrev [2009] : whereas variables in the Eisenberg-Gale convex program represent allocations of goods received by each buyer, variables in CP are prices of goods and the amount of money spent by each agent on each good. We show how these two convex programs are related: one can define a dual convex program for each of these, and these two duals are the same, upto a change of variables.
We next present two natural generalizations of Fisher's market model: In model M 1 , sellers can declare an upper bound on the money they wish to earn (and take back their unsold good), and in model M 2 , buyers can declare an upper bound on the amount to utility they wish to derive (and take back the unused part of their money); see Section 2 for formal definitions.
Model M 2 is clearly natural: it is reasonable to assume that a buyer would only want to buy goods that are necessary, i.e., give a certain bounded amount of utility, and she desires to keep the rest of her money for future use. Our model M 1 is also natural, in particular in the following situation. Assume that each seller is selling his services in the market. In the last half century, society has seen the emergence of a multitude of very high end jobs which call for a lot of expertise and in turn pay very large salaries. Indeed, the holders of such jobs do not need to work full time to make a comfortable living and one sees numerous such people preferring to work for shorter hours and having a lot more time for leisure. High end dentists, doctors and investors fall in this category. Our model M 1 allows such agents to specify a limit on their earnings beyond which they do not wish to sell their services anymore.
Observe that if many agents desire j's services and j has a low upper bound on his earnings, say c j , then the price, p j of this good will be set high enough so that the buyers demand very little of his services. In particular, he will sell only c j /p j fraction of his services. Thus, in model M 1 , the supply of a good is a function of the prices. Similarly, in M 2 , the amount of money a buyer spends in the market is a function of the prices. In the presence of these additional constraints, do equilibria exist and can they be computed in polynomial time?
In this paper, we go further: we give convex programs that capture equilibria for each of the models. Generalizations of CP and the Eisenberg-Gale programs, respectively, yield convex programs for M 1 and M 2 for the case of linear utilities. Existence of equilibria for both models follows from these convex programs. We further show that both models admit rational equilibria, i.e., prices and allocations are rational numbers if all parameters specified in the instance are rational. As a consequence, the ellipsoid algorithm will find a solution to the convex programs in polynomial time. In addition, for M 2 , we also give convex programs for Leontief and CES (for parameter values 0 < ρ < 1) utility functions. Finally, we show that for market M 1 under spending constraint utilities, a generalization of CP yields a convex program.
A completely different way of deriving convex programs for markets follows from the classic Arrow-Hurwicz theorem [Arrow and Hurwicz 1965] , which applies to ArrowDebreu markets with weak gross substitutes (WGS) utilities (this includes linear utilities). We present extensions of the Arrow-Hurwicz's theorem to markets M 1 and M 2 for the linear case and hence derive alternative convex programs for these markets. 7 We note that the Arrow-Hurwicz theorem applies to utility functions satisfying weak gross substitutability (WGS), which includes linear utilities. Our result opens up the possibility that one could extend this approach to all WGS utilities for M 1 and M 2 .
Our paper also contributes to convex programming duality theory 8 . This duality is usually stated in its most general form, with convex objective functions and convex constraints, e.g., see the excellent references by Boyd and Vandenberghe [2009] and Rockafellar [1970] . However, at this level of generality the process of constructing the dual of a convex program is a little tedious, in contrast to LP duality where there is a simple set of rules for obtaining the dual of an LP. In this paper, we consider a special class of convex programs, those with convex objective functions and linear constraints, and derive a simple set of rules to construct the dual, 9 which is almost as simple as the LP case.
These rules have found further applications: to derive convex programs for Fisher markets under spending constraint utilities 10 [Birnbaum et al. 2011] , for Fisher markets with transaction costs [Chakraborty et al. 2010] , and for Arrow-Debreu market with linear utilities . They have been used in the design of algorithms: for simplex like algorithms for spending constraint utilities and perfect price discrimination markets , in analyzing the convergence of the Tatonnement process [Cheung et al. 2013] , in designing online algorithms for scheduling [Buchbinder et al. 2014; Devanur and Huang 2014; Im et al. 2014] , and online algorithms for welfare maximization with production costs [Huang and Kim 2015] . They have also been used in bounding the price of anarchy of certain games [Kulkarni and Mirrokni 2015] .
MODELS
Fisher's model is the following: let A be a set of n divisible goods and B be a set of m buyers. Each buyer i comes to the market with money m i , and we may assume w.l.o.g. that the market has one unit of each good. Each buyer i has a utility function, f i : R m + → R + , giving the utility that i derives from each bundle of goods. Prices p and allocations x are said to form an equilibrium if each buyer i gets an optimal bundle of goods, and each good having non-zero price is fully sold. Clearly, in an equilibrium, each agent will fully spend her money. For convenience, we will assume that each good is sold by a unique seller.
Utility function for buyer i f i : R m + → R + is said to be linear if there are parameters u ij ∈ R + , specifying the utility derived by i from one unit of good j. Her utility for the entire bundle is additive, i.e., f i (x) = j∈B u ij x ij . Utility function f i is said to be Leontief if, given parameters a ij ∈ R + ∪ {0} for each good j ∈ B, f i (x) = min j∈B x ij /a ij . Finally, f i is said to be constant elasticity of substitution (CES) with parameter ρ if given parameters α j for each good j ∈ B,
Our two generalizations of Fisher's model are the following. In the first model, M 1 , each seller j has an upper bound c j on the amount of money j wants to earn in the market. Once he earns c j , selling the least amount of his good, he wants to take back the unsold portion of his good. In equilibrium, buyers spend all their money and get an optimal bundle of goods. In the second model, M 2 , buyers have upper bounds d i on the utility they want to derive in the market. Once buyer i derives utility d i , spending the least amount of money at prices p, she wants to keep the left-over money. Once again, in equilibrium, each good with a positive price should be fully sold.
We next define the spending constraint model. As before, let A be a set of divisible goods and B a set of buyers, |A| = n, |B| = m. Assume that the goods are numbered from 1 to n and the buyers are numbered from 1 to m. Each buyer i ∈ B comes to the market with a specified amount of money, say m i ∈ Q + , and we are specified the quantity, b j ∈ Q + of each good j ∈ A. For i ∈ B and j ∈ A, let f i j : [0, m i ] → R + be the rate function of buyer i for good j; it specifies the rate at which i derives utility per unit of j received, as a function of the amount of her budget spent on j. If the price of j is fixed at p j per unit amount of j, then the function f i j /p j gives the rate at which i derives utility per dollar spent, as a function of the amount of her budget spent on j. 
This function gives the utility derived by i on spending x dollars on good j at price p j . In this paper, we will deal with the case that f i j 's are decreasing step functions. If so, g i j will be a piecewise-linear and concave function. The linear version of Fisher's problem [Brainard and Scarf 2000 ] is the special case in which each f i j is the constant function so that g i j is a linear function. Given prices p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) of all goods, each buyer wants a utility maximizing bundle of goods. Prices p are equilibrium prices if each good with a positive price is fully sold.
CONVEX PROGRAMMING DUALITY

Conjugate
We now define the conjugate of a function, and note some of the properties; see Rockafellar [1970] for a detailed treatment. This will be the key ingredient to extend the simple set of rules for LP duality to convex programs. Suppose that f : R n → R is a function. The conjugate of f is f * : R n → R and is defined as follows:
Although the conjugate is defined for any function f , for the rest of the article, we will assume that f is strictly convex and differentiable, since this is the case that is most interesting to the applications we discuss. Properties of f * :
• f * is strictly convex and differentiable. (This property holds even if f is not strictly convex and differentiable.)
• f * * = f . (Here we use the assumption that f is strictly convex and differentiable.)
We say that (x, µ) form a complementary pair wrt f if they satisfy one of the last two conditions stated above. We now calculate the conjugates of some simple strictly convex and differentiable functions. These will be useful later.
•
Convex programs with linear constraints
Consider the following (primal) optimization problem.
We will derive a minimization problem that is the dual of this, using Lagrangian duality. This is usually a long calculation. The goal of this exercise is to identify a shortcut for the same. Define the Lagrangian function
We say that x is feasible if it satisfies all the constraints of the primal problem. Note that for all λ ≥ 0 and x feasible, L(x, λ) ≥ i c i x i − f (x). Define the dual function
is an upper bound on the optimum value for the primal program. The dual program is essentially min λ≥0 g(λ). We further simplify it as follows. Letting µ i = c i − j a ij λ j , we can rewrite the expression for L as
Thus we get the dual optimization problem:
Note the similarity to LP duality. The differences are as follows. Suppose the concave part of the primal objective is −f (x). There is an extra variable µ i for every variable x i that occurs in f . In the constraint corresponding to x i , −µ i appears on the RHS along with the constant term. Finally the dual objective has f * (µ) in addition to the linear terms. In other words, we relax the constraint corresponding to x i by allowing a slack of µ i , and charge f * (µ) to the objective function. Similarly, the primal program with non-negativity constraints on variables has the following dual program.
As we saw, the optimum for the primal program is lower than the optimum for the dual program (weak duality). In fact, if the primal constraints are strictly feasible, that is there exist x i such that for all j i a ij x ij < b j , then the two optima are the same (strong duality) and the following generalized complementary slackness conditions characterize them:
Similarly the dual of a minimization program has the following form.
Infeasibility and Unboundedness
When an LP is infeasible, the dual becomes unbounded. The same happens with these convex programs as well. We now give the proof for some special cases. Suppose first that the set of linear constraints is itself infeasible, that is, there is no solution to the set of inequalities
Then by Farkas' lemma, we know that there exists numbers λ j ≥ 0 for all j such that
and by multiplying all the λ j by a large positive number, g can be made arbitrarily small. Now suppose that the feasible region defined by the inequalities (1) and the domain of f defined as dom(f ) = {x : f (x) < ∞} are disjoint. Further assume for now that f * (c) < ∞ and that there is a strict separation between the two, meaning that for all x feasible and y ∈ dom(f ), d(x, y) > ǫ for some ǫ > 0. Then once again by Farkas' lemma we have that there exist λ j ≥ 0 for all j and δ > 0 such that
This implies that g(λ) < f * (c) − δ j λ j b j , and as before, by multiplying all the λ j by a large positive number, g can be made arbitrarily small.
CONVEX PROGRAMS FOR FISHER MARKETS
The following is the classic Eisenberg-Gale convex program for Fisher markets with linear utilities. An optimum solution to this program captures equilibrium allocation for the corresponding market.
We now use the technology we developed in the previous section to construct the dual of this convex program. We let the dual variable corresponding to the constraint u i ≤ j u ij x ij be β i and the dual variable corresponding to the constraint i x ij ≤ 1 be p j (these will correspond to the equilibrium prices, hence the choice of notation). We also need a variable µ i that corresponds to the variable u i in the primal program since it appears in the objective in the form of a concave function, m i log u i . We now calculate the conjugate of this function.
In the dual objective, we can ignore the constant terms, c log c − c. We are now ready to write down the dual program which is as follows.
We can easily eliminate µ i from the above to get the following program.
The variables p j 's actually correspond to equilibrium prices. In fact, we can even eliminate the β i 's by observing that in an optimum solution, β i = min j {p j /u ij }. This gives a convex (but not strictly convex) function of the p j 's that is minimized at equilibrium. Note that this is an unconstrained 11 minimization. The function is as follows
It would be interesting to give an intuitive explanation for why this function is minimized at equilibrium. Another interesting property of this function is that the (sub)gradient of this function at any price vector corresponds to the (set of) excess supply of the market with the given price vector. This implies that a tattonement style price update, where the price is increased if the excess supply is negative and is decreased if it is positive, is actually equivalent to gradient descent. Note: A convex program that is very similar to (2) was also discovered independently by Garg [Garg 2008 ]. However it is not clear how they arrived at it, or if they realise that this is the dual of the Eisenberg-Gale convex program. Going back to Convex Program (2), we write an equivalent program by taking the logs in each of the constraints.
We now think of q j = log p j and γ i = − log β i as the variables, and get the following convex program.
We now take the dual of this program. Again, we need to calculate the conjugate of the convex function that appears in the objective, namely e x . We could calculate it from scratch, or derive it from the ones we have already calculated. Recall that if
The dual variable corresponding to the constraint γ i + q j ≥ log u ij is b ij and the dual variable corresponding to e qj is p j (by abuse of notation, but it turns out that these once again correspond to equilibrium prices). Thus we get the following convex program of [Shmyrev 2009 ], which we call CP .
Extensions to other markets
The Eisenberg-Gale convex program can be generalized to capture the equilibrium of many other markets, such as markets with Leontief utilities, or network flow markets. In fact, [Jain and Vazirani 2010 ] identify a whole class of such markets whose equilibrium is captured by convex programs similar to that of Eisenberg and Gale (called EG markets) . We can take the dual of all such programs to get corresponding generalizations for the convex program (2). For instance, a Leontief utility is of the form U i = min j {x ij /φ ij } for some given values φ ij . The Eisenberg-Gale-type convex program for Fisher markets with Leontief utilities is as follows, along with its dual (after some simplification as before).
Primal: max i m i log u i s.t.
In general for an EG-type convex program, the dual has the objective function
where β i is the minimum cost buyer i has to pay in order to get one unit of utility. For instance, for the network flow market, where the goods are edge capacities in a network and the buyers are source-sink pairs looking to maximize the flow routed through the network, then β i is the cost of the cheapest path between the source and the sink given the prices on the edges.
However, for some markets, it is not clear how to generalize the Eisenberg-Gale convex program, but the dual generalizes easily. In each of the cases, the optimality conditions can be easily seen to be equivalent to equilibrium conditions. We now show some examples of this.
Quasi-linear utilities. Suppose the utility of buyer i is j (u ij − p j )x ij . In particular, if all the prices are such that p j > u ij , then the buyer prefers to not be allocated any good and go back with his budget unspent. It is easy to see that the following convex program captures the equilibrium prices for such utilities. In fact, given this convex program, one could take its dual to get an EG-type convex program as well.
Although this is a small modification of the Eisenberg-Gale convex program, it is not clear how one would arrive at this directly without going through the dual.
Transaction costs. Suppose that we are given, for every pair, buyer i and good j, a transaction cost c ij that the buyer has to pay per unit of the good in addition to the price of the good. Thus the total money spent by buyer i is j (p j + c ij )x ij . Chakraborty et al. [2010] show that the following convex program captures the equilibrium prices for such markets.
CONVEX PROGRAMS FOR GENERALIZATIONS OF FISHER'S MODEL
In this section, we give a convex program for each market model and a complete proof that optimal solution of the convex program gives an equilibrium price of the market.
Market M1: Sellers have earning limits
Linear utilities. This convex program is a natural extension of program CP presented in Section 4, with an additional set of constraints for sellers having earning limits:
Here b ij is the amount of money buyer i spends on good j, and q j is the total amount of spending on good j. Contraint 8 makes sure that the spending on good j does not exceed the earning limit of seller j. PROOF. Let λ j , µ j , η i be the dual variables for contraints 6, 8, 7 respectively. By the KKT conditions, optimal solutions must satisfy the following:
From the first 3 conditions, we have ∀i ∈ B, j ∈ A : uij qj e µ j ≤ e ηi and if b ij > 0 then uij qj e µ j = e ηi . Let p j = q j e µj . We will show that p is an equilibrium price with spending b.
From the above observation, it is easy to see that each buyer i only spends money on his maximum bang-per-buck (MBB) goods at price p, i.e., goods that give her maximum utility per unit money spent. We also have to check that an optimal solution given by the convex program satisfies the market clearing conditions. Constraint 7 guarantees that each buyer i must spend all his money. Therefore, we only have to show that the amount seller j earns is the mininum between p j and c j . If q j = c j and q j ≤ q j e µj = p j . If q j < c j then µ j = 0 and p j = q j < c j . Thus, in both cases, q j = min(p j , c j ) as desired.
Spending constraint utilities. The convex program for model M 1 under spending constraint utility functions is as follows:
Here b l ij is the amount of money buyer i spends on good j under segment l, and q j is the total amount of spending on good j. PROOF. Let λ j , µ j , η i , γ ijl be the dual variables for contraints 10, 13, 11, 12 respectively. By the KKT conditions, optimal solutions must satisfy the following:
(1) ∀i ∈ B, j ∈ A, l ∈ S : log u
Let p j = q j e µj . We will prove that p is an equilibrium price with spending b. The second KKT condition says that for a fixed pair of buyer i and good j, b
Therefore, the ratio u l ij /e γ ijl is the same for every segment l under which i spends money on j. From KKT condition 7, γ ijl > 0 implies b l ij = B l ij . It follows that for each good j, i must finish spending money on a segment with higher rate before starting spending money on a segment with lower rate.
From the first 3 KKT conditions, we have: pj is maximized among all segments that i can spend money on, i.e. segments such that b l ij < B l ij . Therefore, we can conclude that each buyer i is spending according to his best spending strategy.
By complementary slackness condition, if q j < c j then µ i = 0 and q j = p j . Otherwise, if p j = c j then q j ≤ p j . Therefore, in this model, the amount seller j earns is the minimum between c j and p j .
Market M2: Buyers have utility limits
Linear utilities. The convex program for the linear utility with buyers having utility limits is a natural extension of the Eisenberg-Gale program:
∀i, j, x ij ≥ 0.
In this program, x ij is the amount of good j allocated to buyer i, and u i is the amount of utility that buyer i obtains. Contraint 16 guarantees that the amount of utility buyer i gets does not exceed his utility limit d i .
LEMMA 5.3. Convex program P3 captures the equilibrium prices of market model M 2 under linear utility function.
PROOF. Let λ i , µ i , p j be the dual variables for contraints 15, 16, 17 respectively. By the KKT conditions, optimal solutions must satisfy the following:
From the first 3 conditions, we have ∀i ∈ B, j ∈ A : We will show that p is an equilibrium price with allocation x. From the above observation, it is easy to see that each buyer i only spends money on his MBB goods at price p. Moreover, we know that if p j > 0 then good j must be fully sold. Therefore, the only remaining thing to prove is that at price p each buyer either spends all his money or attains his utility limit. If u i = d i then buyer i reaches his utility limit and the amount of money he spends is m i − µ i d i , which is at most m i . If u i < d i then µ i = 0 and the amount of money he spends is m i .
Leontief utilities. The convex program for the Leontief utility model is as follows:
LEMMA
Convex program P4 captures the equilibrium prices of market model M 2 under Leontief utility function.
PROOF. Let λ ij , µ i , p j be the dual variables for contraints 19, 20, 21 respectively. By the KKT conditions, optimal solutions must satisfy the following:
Notice that in this model, we may assume that u i > 0 for all i ∈ B. It follows from constraint 19 that x ij = 0 if and only if φ ij = 0. From the second KKT condition, we know that if φ ij > 0, we must have λ ij = −p j . Substituting in the third condition we have:
It follows that m i − µ i u i is actually the amount of money that buyer i spends. By complementary slackness condition, if u i < d i then µ i = 0 and i spends all his budget. Otherwise, if u i = d i then m i − µ i u i ≤ m i . Therefore, in this model, a buyer i either spends all his budget or attains his utility limit. Moreover, we know that if p j > 0 then good j is fully sold. Thus, p is an equilibrium price with allocation x.
CES utilities. The convex program for the CES utility model with parameter ρ is as follows:
Notice that in this model,
has the same term u 1−ρ i u ij for all x ij 's. Moreover, ∂u i /∂x ij decreases when x ij increases. It follows that the best spending strategy for a buyer i is to start with x ij = 0 ∀j ∈ A and spend money on goods j that maximize the ratio ∂ui/∂xij pj at every point. At the end of the procedure, all goods j such that x ij > 0 will have the same value for ∂ui/∂xij pj , and that value is the maximum over all goods.
LEMMA 5.5. Convex program P5 captures the equilibrium prices of market model M 2 under CES utility function.
PROOF. Let λ i , µ i , p j be the dual variables for contraints 23, 24, 25 respectively. By the KKT conditions, optimal solutions must satisfy the following:
We will prove that p is an equilibrium price with allocation x. From the first there KKT conditions, we have
and equality happens when x ij > 0. Therefore, x is in agreement with the best spending strategy of the buyers, which says that for each buyer i, if x ij > 0 then ∂ui/∂xij pj is maximized over all j's. Moreover, we can see that m i − µ i u i is the amount of money buyer i spends. By complementary slackness condition, if u i < d i then µ i = 0 and i spends all his budget. Otherwise, if
Therefore, in this model, a buyer i either spends all his budget or attains his utility limit. Moreover, we know that if p j > 0 then good j is fully sold. Thus, p is an equilibrium price with allocation x.
EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS
In this section, we study the existence and the uniqueness of equilibria for the market models. For model M 1 , we show a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium. The condition works for both cases of linear utility and spending constraint utility. On the uniqueness side, we show the spending vector, q = (q 1 , . . . , q m ) where q j is the money spent on good j, is unique. For model M 2 , we show that an equilibrium always exists for all utility functions we mentioned in the previous section. On the uniqueness side, the utility vector is unique.
Despite the fact that in Fisher model we have the uniqueness of price equilibrium, it is easy to see that it is not true in our generalizations. For model M 1 , consider a market with only one buyer with utility function u(x) = x 1 and one seller. Let m 1 = 1 and c = 1. It is easy to see every price in bigger than 1 is an equilibrium price. For model M 2 , again consider a market with only one buyer with utility function u(x) = x 1 and one seller. Let d 1 = 1 and m 1 = 2. It is easy to see every price in interval [1, 2] is an equilibrium price. Similarly, we can prove that for the case of spending constraint utility, the program is feasible if and only if j c j ≥ i m i . If j c j < i m i then the feasible region is empty because the set of constraints 10, 13 and 11 can not be satisfied together. Using a similar argument as in the previous part, we can show that if the amount of money that i spends on j is m i c j / j c j then constraints 10, 13 and 11 are all satisfied. We only need to guarantee that contraint 12 is satisfied as well. This can be done by choosing appropriate y PROOF. Consider two distinct price equilibriums p and p ′ , their corresponding spending vectors q and q ′ and their corresponding demand vectors x and x ′ . Note that
Consider price vector r = (r 1 , . . . , r m ) where ∀k, r k = max(p k , p ′ k ), its corresponding spending vector q r and its corresponding demand vectors x r . Note that by changing prices from p to r we may only increasing the prices. Therefore, it is easy to see under linear or spending constraint utility functions the demand of good j going from prices p to r would not decrease if p ′ j < p j = r j . Therefore, we have q
We can do the same for all j and show ∀j, q r j = max(q j , q ′ j ). For the sake of a contradiction suppose ∃j, q j > q ′ j then using the later it is easy to show j q r j > j q j = j q ′ j = i m i which is contradiction because the money spent on goods cannot be more than the total budget. Therefore, ∀j , q j = q ′ j and the lemma follows. PROOF. An equilibrium price exists if and only if the feasible region of the convex program is not empty. In P3, P4 and P5, x ij = 0 for all i ∈ B, j ∈ A is a feasible solution. Therefore, the feasible region is not empty and an equilibrium exists.
LEMMA 6.4. In model M 2 under linear, Leontief and CES utility functions, the utilities of an equilibrium are unique.
PROOF. In section 5.2, we showed every equilibrium correspond to an solution of a convex program with an objective function of the form i m i log u i . It is easy to see that the objective function is strictly concave. Therefore, there is a unique vector u that maximizes the objective function and the lemma follows.
RATIONALITY
In this section, we prove rationality results for the case of model M 2 under linear utility, and model M 1 under linear utility and spending constraint utility. Specifically, we show that for those market models, a rational equilibrium exists if an equilibrium exists and all the parameters are rational numbers. PROOF. Let A i be the set of goods that buyer i spends money on, A be the family of A i 's, and L be the set of sellers reaching their earning limits. An equilibrium price p, the corresponding spending y and inverse MBB value α, if existed, must be a point inside the polyhedron P (A, L) bounded by the following constraints:
If an equilibrium price exists, then A and L such that P (A, L) is non-empty must also exist. Every point inside that non-empty polyhedron must also correspond to an equilibrium price. Since u ij 's m i 's and c j 's are rational numbers, a vertex of P (A, L) gives a rational equilibrium price. It then follows from Lemma 6.1 that a rational equilibrium exists if and only if j c j ≥ i m i . − ij sets, and L be the set of sellers reaching their earning limits. An equilibrium price p, the corresponding spending y and inverse MBB value α, if existed, must be a point inside the polyhedron P (S, L) bounded by the following constraints:
Suppose that all the parameters specified are rational numbers. Again, we can see that a rational equilibrium must also exist if an equilibrium exists. It then follows that a rational equilibrium exists if and only if j c j ≥ i m i .
Market M2: Buyers have utility limits
LEMMA 7.3. In model M 2 under linear utility functions, a rational equilibrium exists if all the parameters specified are rational numbers.
PROOF. Let A i be the set of goods that buyer i spends money on, A be the family of A i 's, and L be the set of buyers reaching their utility limits. An equilibrium price p, the corresponding spending y and inverse MBB value α, if existed, must be a point inside the polyhedron P (A, L) bounded by the following constraints:
Suppose that all the parameters specified in this model are rational numbers. By a similar argument to Lemma 7.1, we can see that an equilibrium exists if and only if a rational equilibrium exists. It follow from Lemma 6.3 that a rational equilibrium price must always exist if all the parameters specified are rational numbers.
GENERALIZED ARROW-HURWICZ THEOREM FOR LINEAR UTILITY
In this section, we prove the generalized version of Arrow-Hurwicz theorem for both models M 1 and M 2 for the case of linear utilities. First we give some notation needed for the proofs. We define a spending function to be a function F : [n] × [m] → R such that F (i, j) denotes the amount of money that buyer i spends on good j, and a spending vector v to be an m-dimensional vector indicating how much money is spent on each good, that is, v j = i F (i, j). PROOF. Again, we assume there are two phases during which the price/spending vectors pair change from (p, z) to (q, v).
(1) In the first phase, the price vector change from p to q. However, each agent does not spend his money on his optimal bundle at q. Instead, he still spends money the same way he does at equilibrium p. Therefore, the spending vector z remains unchanged in this phase. (2) In the second phase, the price vector remains unchanged, and the spending vector changes from z to v. Let y = v − z be a vector reflecting the change between two spending vectors.
Our goal is to prove that f T q p > ∆ q , and this is equivalent to proving
Here sup(j) is the amount of good that seller j is willing to sell under price q.
First we prove that
We may assume that the goods are arranged so that
Since p is an equilibrium price, the total budget of all buyers is k j=1 c j + n j=k+1 p j . The total value of goods that sellers willing to sell at price q is: l j=1 c j + k j=l+1 q j + k+s j=k+1 c j + n j=k+s+1 q j Therefore, the total excess demand is:
The inequality follows from the facts that q j ≤ c j and q j ≤ c j ≤ p j .
The reason for the inequality is as follows. If p j ≥ q j then pj qj − 1 ≥ 0, and Therefore,
It is easy to see that if equality happens, q must be an equilibrium price. Therefore, for every non-equilibrium price q, we must have n j=1 zj qj − sup(j) p j > ∆ q . Next we prove that n j=1 yj pj qj ≥ 0. Recall that y is the difference between two spendings vectors v and z. We can break y into primitive spending changes from z to v. . It follows that for all primitive spending changes from j to k,
as desired.
Market M2: Buyers have utility limits
We first define a maximal spending to be a spending function such that every buyer either reaches his utility limit or his budget limit. Note that in model M 2 , every spending function should be a maximal spending. We also define an optimal spending to be a maximal spending in which every buyer spends money on his optimal bundle.
First, we state a lemma needed for proving of the theorem. Roughly speaking, the lemma says that among all maximal spendings, an optimal spending results in least money spent and most utility achieved for buyers. LEMMA 8.2. Let F be a maximal spending and G be an optimal spending of the same price vector. For every buyer i:
(1) The money i spends with respect to F is at least the money i spends with respect to G. (2) The utility i gets with respect to F is at most the utility i gets with respect to G.
PROOF.
(1) Assume the money i spends with respect to F is less than the money i spends with respect to G for the sake of contradiction. Since i spends money on his optimal bundle with respect to G, the amount of utility i gets with respect to F must also be less than the amount of utility i gets with respect to G. Therefore, with respect to F , i reaches neither budget limit nor utility limit. This is a contradiction since F is a maximal spending. (2) Assume the utility i gets with respect to F is more than the utility i gets with respect to G. Since i spends money on his optimal bundle with respect to G, the amount of money i spends with respect to F must also be more than the amount of money i spends with respect to G. Therefore, with respect to G, i reaches neither budget limit nor utility limit. This is a contradiction since G is a maximal spending. Now we can prove the main theorem THEOREM 8.3. Let p be a equilibrium price in market model M 2 under linear utility functions. Then for any non-equilibrium price q, f T q p > ∆ q where f q is the excess demand vector at q, and ∆ q = f Tis the total excess demand value at q. PROOF. We assume there are two phases during which the price/spending vectors pair change from (p, p) to (q, v).
(1) In the first phase, the price vector change from p to q. However, each agent does not spend his money on his optimal bundle at q. Instead, he still only spends money on the set of good he wants at equilibirum p. Specifically, if at price p a buyer i spends
has the same utility function as i but only spends money on good t. The spending of i in this phase is the combination of all spendings of i t s at q. Let F be the spending function of the original buyers, and F be the spending function of the divided buyers B. Note that F is a maximal spending but might not be an optimal spending. Let z be the spending vector with respect to F (and thus also to F ). (2) In the second phase, the price vector remains unchanged, and the spending vector changes from z to v. Let G be the spending function of the original buyers in this phase. We know that G is an optimal spending. Let y = v − z be a vector reflecting the change between two spending vectors.
First, we prove that n j=1 zj qj − 1 p j > ∆ q . Recall that z j is the amount of money spent on good j in the first phase, where a buyer is only interested in the set of goods he buys at equilibrium p. We break the analysis into 2 cases: -q j ≥ p j : Consider a divided buyer i spending money on j at equilibrium price p. If i spends all his budget at equilibrium, his spending on j will remain unchanged in this phase. If i reaches his utility limit at equilibrium, his spending on j will inrease by a factor of at most q j /p j . It follows that z j ≤ q j . -q j < p j : Consider a divided buyer i spending money on j at equilibrium price p. If i is at his budget limit at equilibrium, his spending on j may decrease by a factor of at least q j /p j . If i reaches his utility limit at equilibrium, his spending on j will decrease by a factor of exactly q j /p j . It follows that z j ≥ q j .
Therefore, in both cases
Since G is an optimal spending with respect to the original buyers and the utility function is linear, G can be translated into a corresponding optimal spending G with respect to the divided buyers B. Note that n j=1 v j is a total optimal spending with respect to G and therefore also with respect to G, and n j=1 z j is a total maximal spending with respect to F . Since F is a feasible spending and G is an optimal spending of the same price q, using the first part of Lemma 8.2, we have n j=1 z j ≥ n j=1 v j . Therefore, n j=1 zj qj − 1 p j ≥ n j=1 v j − n j=1 q j = ∆ q . Moreover, it can be seen that if equality happens, q must also be an equilibrium price. Therefore, for every nonequilibrium price q, we must have n j=1 zj qj − 1 p j > ∆ q . Now we prove that n j=1 yjpj qj ≥ 0 by analyzing over primitive spending changes.
Since F is a maximal spending and G is an optimal spending of the same price, from the second part of Lemma 8.2, we know that the amount of utility each divided buyer gets in G is at least as much as the amount he gets in F . Consider a divided buyer i ∈ B. In F , i spends money on a single good j. In G, assume that i spends money on k 1 , . . . , k l . We can break the spending change of i from phase 1 to phase 2 into primitive changes j → k 1 , . . . , j → k t , . . . , j → k l . The notation j → k means instead of spending δ j on j according to F , i spends δ k on k according to G and attains at least as much utility. Let u ij and u ik be the amount of utility i gets from 1 unit of good j and k respectively. Since i prefers j to k at equilibrium price p, we have
since the amount of utility he gets by spending δ j on j at price q j is at most the amount of utility he gets by spending δ k on k at price q k , u ij δj qj ≤ u ik δ k q k . Therefore, First, we give an overview of the ellipsoid method. Suppose we want to find a point in a bounded polyheron P and have access to a seperation oracle that can answer the question of whether a point z is in P or not, and give a seperating hyperplane in the latter case. The ellipsoid method works as follows. We first start with an initial ellipsoid that is guarantee to contain the entire polyhedron P . We then call the seperation oracle on the center z of the ellipsoid. If z is in P then we found a point in P as desired. If z is not in P then the oracle returns a seperating hyperplane such that P and z are on the opposite sides of that hyperplane. Note that this seperating hyperplane cuts our ellipsoid into two half-ellipsoids, one of them contains P and the other contains z. We then find another ellipsoid enclosing the half-ellipsoid that contains P and recurse on that ellipsoid. The algorithm stops when we find a point inside P or when the volume of the bounding ellipsoid becomes small enough and we are able to claim that there is no point in P . In this section, we apply the ellipsoid method to find an equilibrium of our market models under linear utility function. Specifically, we show how to check if a price is an equilibrium or not in polynomial time, implement a polynomial-time seperation oracle and form an initial ellipsoid.
For the running time analysis, we restate the Theorem 12 from [Jain 2004 ], which we utilize to demonstrate that a separation oracle can be used compute equilibrium solutions in polynomial time if a rational solution exists. THEOREM 9.1. Given a convex set via a strong separation oracle with a guarantee that the set contains a point with binary encoding length at most φ, a point in the convex set can be found in polynomial time.
This theorem is proved using ellipsoid method and simultaneous diophantine approximation, and we refer the readers to the paper [Jain 2004 ] for a detailed proof.
Checking if a given price is an equilibrium price
Given a price p, the MBB graph is a directed bipartite graph with directed edge (i, j) between buyer i and good j if and only if j is an MBB good of i at price p. We can build a directed network as follows: assign capacity of infinity to all edges in the MBB graph; introduce a source vertex s and a directed edge from s to every i ∈ B with capacity equal to the amount that i is willing to spend; introduce a sink vertex t and a directed edge from every j ∈ A to t with capacity equal to the value of good that j is willing to sell. After that, checking if a given price is an equilibrium price can be done via one s − t max-flow computation in the network.
